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THE FAILURE OF GISSEL
BARGAINING ORDERS
Terry A. Bethel*
Catherine Melfi**
I. INTRODUCTION
The principal responsibility of the National Labor Relations Board1
("NLRB" or "Board") is to safeguard the right of private sector
employees to choose whether they will be represented by labor
unions. Much of the Board's activity centers around the conduct of
so-called representation elections,2 in which employees cast ballots
for or against union representation.3 In the typical case, the election
follows several weeks or even months of campaigning, both by the
employer and by the union that seeks representative status.4
The campaigns are often quite spirited, with both the employer
and union appealing to employee sentiment through the use of writ-
ten propaganda, impassioned speeches, movies and various other
tactics. Indeed, the representation of employer interests in such
* Professor of Law, Indiana University. Funding for this project was provided, in part,
by National Science Foundation Grant No. SES-8618517 and the Indiana University
Multidisciplinary Ventures Fund. We would also like to thank the National Labor Relations
Board for their cooperation in furnishing information for our work.
** Adjunct Professor, Indiana University.
1. The NLRB was created for the express purpose of implementing the government's
labor policies embodied in the National Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1994).
2. See JuLrus G. GETMAN & BERTRAND B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: Tnm BASIC
PROCESSES, LAW AND PRACIcn 16-17 (1988); see also ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON
LABOR LA.W: UNiONIzAION AND CoLEcrrvE BARGAINInr, 40-41 (1976).
3. A review of the Board's procedures and its regulation of representation campaign
tactics is beyond the scope of this article. For a thorough discussion see GETMAN &
POGREBrN, supra note 2, at 16-95 and GORMCAN, supra note 2, at 40-92.
4. For a general discussion on campaign processes see GETMAN & PoGREBiN, supra
note 2, at 16-79.
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campaigns has become a lucrative business, spawning the growth of
both law firms and management consulting businesses. 5
The campaigns do not always merely appeal to the reason of the
electorate. Skittish employers sometimes, often with the assistance
of attorneys or consultants, use threats, promises of benefits or even
more drastic tactics as a way of influencing employee attitudes. It is
the Board's responsibility to regulate such conduct, which it does
principally through its unfair labor practice authority.6
The National Labor Relations Act7 ("NLRA") outlaws employer
conduct that coerces, threatens or otherwise interferes with the
employees' right to choose union representation.8 In addition, it
forbids discrimination against employees on account of their union
sympathies.9 It is these two unfair labor practices, sections 8(a)(1) 1°
and 8(a)(3), 11 that carry most of the load for employer misconduct
in union representational campaigns.
The extent to which employer speech can constitute an unfair
labor practice has been a matter of much controversy within the
NLRB and between it and the federal courts.12 Even though the
line may be hard to draw, there is a general agreement that at some
point, employer speech can become sufficiently threatening to
5. For a review of some of the problems associated with such enterprises and the
Board's mixed success in regulating them, see Terry A. Bethel, Profiting from Unfair Labor
Practices: A Proposal to Regulate Management Representatives, 79 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 506, 509
(1984).
6. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 160 (1994). In addition to its unfair labor practice authority,
the Board can sanction some election misconduct merely by setting the election aside and
ordering a new one. See Gorman, supra note 2, at 46-49.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1994).
8. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
9. See id. § 158(a)(3).
10. Section 8(a)(1) states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer -
(1) to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title.
Id. § 158(a)(1).
11. Section 8(a)(3) states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer -
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization ....
Id. § 158(a)(3).
12. See GowA., supra note 2, at 148-51.
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interfere with free choice.' 3 In addition, the Board has held that
employer conduct (as opposed to speech) can sometimes threaten
employees in the exercise of their rights. 4 Finally, the NLRA pro-
tects employees who are discharged or otherwise discriminated
against in retaliation for their union proclivities. 5
Discovering such unlawful acts is only part of the Board's author-
ity. Additionally, it has both the power and the responsibility to
remedy the resulting harm. 6 The Board has no power to punish
employers who engage in unlawful conduct, even if they do so
deliberately.' 7 Rather, its remedial power is restorative, not
punitive.' 8
The typical remedy for speech or conduct that threatens employ-
ees is to post a cease and desist order promulgated by the Board.' 9
Other remedies include reimbursement for lost wages or benefits
and assurances that the employer will not repeat its unlawful con-
duct.20 The Board also has the power to reinstate employees who
are discharged for their union activity, a remedy of dubious utility2'
13. See id. at 148-51; see also NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 616-20
(1969).
14. See GoRMAN, supra note 2, at 137-42.
15. See id. at 137-42.
16. See GETMAN & POGREBIN, supra note 2, at 72-73.
17. See id. at 73.
18. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). See generally GETN &
PooREBIN, supra note 2, at 72-79. The Board's remedy power is spelled out in 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c), which says that, upon a finding of unfair labor practice, the Board shall have the
power to:
issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease
and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action
including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate
the policies of this subchapter.
29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
19. See GErMAN & POGREBIN, supra note 2, at 73.
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
21. Two separate studies found that most employees who were ordered to be reinstated
never actually returned and, of those who did, over three quarters leave within a relatively
short time. The first study was conducted in the early 1960's by former congressman, then
graduate student, Les Aspin. It is summarized in Hearings on H.R. 11725 Before the Special
Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 901 Cong., 11 Sess. 3-12 (1967).
The results of the second study are reported in Elvis C. Stephens & Warren Cheany, A Study
of the Reinstatement Remedy Under the National Labor Relations Act, 25 la4. L.J. 31 (1974).
For a discussion of these studies and the NLRB's general remedial effectiveness see Paul
Weller, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96
HARv. L. R-v. 1769 (1983).
1997]
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Often, the representation election is delayed pending resolution
of charges that the employer has committed an unfair labor prac-
tice.' If the Board discovers unlawful conduct only after the elec-
tion, it has the authority to set the election aside and order a new
one.23 In either case, the Board's response is of questionable value.
Most observers believe that the delay which attends investigation
and prosecution of pre-election misconduct works to the advantage
of employers.24 In addition, while employers win more elections
than unions, the employer success rate is even greater in rerun
elections.25
In particularly egregious cases, the Board has what it considers to
be its most significant and most potent remedy: the Gissel bargain-
ing order.26 This remedy acknowledges that other remedial meas-
ures are not always effective in restoring the status quo. Sometimes,
the Board speculates that the employer's conduct will have been so
outrageous that mere cease and desist orders and reinstatement
orders will not dissipate the harm. In those cases, it is not possible
to hold a free election, since the "laboratory conditions" 27 that sur-
round the process have been destroyed.28
The Supreme Court's opinion in Gissel approved the NLRB's
practice of ordering employers to bargain as a remedy for their seri-
ous unfair labor practices when two conditions are met.2 9 First, the
Board must determine that the employer's conduct has destroyed
any prospect of a free election.30 Most labor law scholarship dis-
cussing Gissel bargaining orders have dealt with the Board's diffi-
culty in defining when this criterion is satisfied.3 ' If the Board clears
that hurdle, it can order the employer to bargain as a remedy for its
22. See GmnwA & POGREBiN, supra note 2, at 27-28.
23. See GomAvN, supra note 2, at 47.
24. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 611 n.30.
25. See Daniel H. Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C. L. REv. 208 (1963).
26. Although bargaining orders existed prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Gissel
Packing, they were expressly approved by the Court in that case. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 616.
27. In General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948), the Board spoke of its election
procedure as a "laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as
nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees." Id. at 127.
28. See generally Gissel, 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
29. See id. at 579.
30. See id. at 613-15.
31. See e.g., Jacqui C. Hood, Bargaining Orders: The Effect of Gissel Packing Co., 32
LAm. L.J. 203, 210 (1981); Lawrence F. Dopplet & Jeffrey Ladd, Gissel Packing Co.-The
NLRB Applies the Standards, 49 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 161, 164 (1972).
[Vol. 14:423
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unlawful conduct if it finds that, as some point, the union enjoyed
majority status.32 The Board usually makes this determination by
asking whether a majority of employees in the unit signed union
authorization cards, typically used by the union as a way of
obtaining an NLRB election. 3
The Board assumes that the Gissel bargaining order will restore
the status quo by establishment of the collective bargaining rela-
tionship that the employer's unlawful conduct destroyed. 4 Some of
the Board's assumptions about the creation of such relationships
have been examined by Professor Laura Cooper.35 Little has been
done, however, to examine the validity of the Board's assumptions
about whether the relationship will endure and how employees,
employers and unions will react.36
32. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 610.
33. Unions obtain such signatures during the early stages of the organizational drive.
The NLRB requires that the union make a substantial showing of interest in order to petition
for an election, which usually equates to signed cards from 30% of the employees in the
proposed bargaining unit. The cards employees sign are ordinarily regular union membership
applications and are not limited in scope to the election process. Indeed, if more than half of
the employees sign, the employer can recognize the union based solely on the cards. See
Gissel, 395 U.S. at 595-610 (discussing generally the use of these cards).
34. See id.
35. See generally Laura Cooper, Authorization Cards and Union Representation Election
Outcome: An Empirical Assessment of the Assumption Underlying the Supreme Court's
Gissel Decision, 79 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 87 (1984). Professor Cooper tested the Board's
assumption in Gissel that a union that obtains a majority of union authorization cards would
have won the election, absent the employer's unfair labor practice. See id. at 114-41. She
found that a union with a bare majority of union authorization cards was actually more likely
to lose an election than to win it. See id. at 137. In fact, unions did not have an even chance of
winning an election until it had cards from almost 63% of the employees. See id. at 119.
Moreover, once a union has cards from 70% of the employees, the union's chance of winning
does not improve significantly with an increase in the number of cards signed. See id. at 119.
Even unions that had cards from over 90% of the employees won only 65.7% of the time. See
id.
36. There are three other studies that address similar problems. See Benjamin
Wolkinson, The Remedial Efficacy of NLRB Remedies in Joy Silk Cases, 55 ComRm.L L.
Rnv. 1 (1969); Rosemary O'Shea, Gissel Bargain Orders (1982) (unpublished LL.M. thesis,
Harvard University) (on file with author); Benjamin Wolkinson et al., The Remedial Efficacy
of Gissel Bargaining Orders, 10 INDus. REL. L.J. 509 (1989).
The first Wolkinson study examines the effectiveness of bargaining orders issued under a
Gissel forerunner, Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950). See Benjamin
Volkinson, The Remedial Efficacy of NLRB Remedies in Joy Silk Cases, 55 CORnLL L.
REv. 1 (1969). The Joy Silk decision reiterates established precedent. See id. at 5. Under Joy
Silk, the Board issued a bargaining order whenever an employer rejected a union claim to
majority status without a good faith doubt that the union enjoyed majority status. See id. at 3.
Thus, in order to obtain a Joy Silk Order, the Board did not have to find the employer guilty
of unfair labor practices that were calculated to destroy the union's majority status. See id. at
1997]
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5-6. In fact, the Board did not have to find that the union's majority had been destroyed,
which is a key tenet of the Gissel case. See id. at 6. Wolkinson's study, then, included cases in
which the union retained its majority. See id. By contrast, our work focuses on unions that,
the Board has found, no longer have a majority at the time the bargaining order issues.
Interestingly, the Board abandoned the good faith doubt standard of Joy Silk in the Gissel
case. See O'Shea, supra, at 7. Its position was later supported by the Supreme Court in
Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
The unpublished Harvard LL.M. thesis written by Rosemary O'Shea also addresses similar
issues. See O'Shea supra. It was this work that Paul Weiler relied on to suggest that Gissel
orders are not effective remedies. See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers'
Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HIARv. L. Rtv. 1769, 1795 (1983). Like us,
O'Shea sought to determine whether Gissel Order unions retain their representative status to
bargain a contract. See O'Shea, supra. Although her study is interesting, it was quite limited
in scope and was not conceived and executed in accordance with the tenets of the scientific
method. See id. at 54. O'Shea located the names of 90 attorneys from NLRB case records
between 1976 and 1980, and wrote to all of them. See id. She received 38 responses. See id.
FmaUy, a more recent study by Wolkinson examines many of the issues that we address,
including a short overlap in study periods. See Benjamin Wolkinson et al., The Remedial
Efficacy of Gissel Bargaining Orders, 10 INus. Rt.. L.J. 509 (1989) [hereinafter Wolkinson
et al.]. Wolkinson et al. studied a sample drawn from the three and one-half year period
between January 1981 and July 1984. See id. at 514. Our study group includes 1981 and
(because we chose to study NLRB fiscal years) the first nine months of 1982.
Although it is not entirely clear how Wolkinson et al. chose their study group, their process
for identifying cases seems seriously flawed. Unlike our study, which identified all of the
Gissel orders issued over a four year period, Wolkinson et al. selected a sample of 47 cases,
apparently drawing all of them from cases that had been reviewed by courts of appeals. See
id. at 514. The authors assert that this represents all Gissel appellate decisions during that
period and further claim that they could not identify more cases because the Shepards
citation system does not list open cases. See iL at 514 n.17. It is not clear what the authors
mean by that assertion. It is true that Shepards would not list the results of an appellate
decision until after the court ruled. But the NLRB Shepards would list the Board's decision
and then simply note that it had been appealed. We located many of our cases in this manner.
One must question whether the authors' methodology identified all of the cases issued
from 1981 to mid-1984 and whether the cases they did find are a representative sample. Our
research disclosed many more cases, 110 of which were reviewed by the courts. In fact, our
research uncovered 49 appellate opinions, 36 of which enforced Gissel orders, from January
1981 through September 1982, a period equal to only half of the Wolkinson et al. study
period. Since the Wolkinson study period would include those cases, it seems unlikely that
there were only 47 such cases in the three and one-half years they studied. The emphasis on
appellate cases might also skew the results, a possibility Wolkinson et al. acknowledge in
their article. See id. More than a third of Gissel orders are not appealed, and it may be that
the employers most likely to resist collective bargaining at all costs are the ones most likely to
appeal. See id. at 514. If nothing else, it further delays the obligation to bargain.
One must also question the Wolkinson et al. assertion that the authors could not study
many unappealed NLRB decisions because the cases were not "closed." See id. The authors
do not reveal what they mean by "closed." Of course, if the employer had appealed to the
courts, the case would remain open and, during the appeal, there would be no bargaining.
Such cases should be excluded. It may be, however, that the authors excluded cases merely
because the NLRB had not closed its case file. This would be a peculiar reason to exclude a
case from the study. After some period of time, the Board has a compliance officer
investigate whether the employer has complied with the Board's order. It is not realistic,
[Vol. 14:423
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This paper examines the durability of collective bargaining rela-
tionships established by Gissel Bargaining orders. By studying the
results obtained in most relationships established by the Board over
a four year period, we are able to offer answers to questions which
the Board has only speculated. In short, we are able to present evi-
dence, contrary to NLRB assumptions, that the Gissel bargaining
order does not lead to productive collective bargaining relation-
ships that protect the rights of employees who were subject to seri-
ous unfair labor practices.
II. DATA COLLECTION
We chose to study the population of Gissel bargaining orders the
NLRB issued during its fiscal years of 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982.
however, to assume that nothing has happened just because the Board has not closed its file.
Our research indicated that some cases remained open because the employer had refused to
comply (though in no case did the Board seek contempt sanctions). Surely such cases should
be included in an examination of bargaining order effectiveness. In addition, we were not
able to identify any common standard for when regional offices would close case files. It
seems likely, then, that Wolkinson et al., who studied only five unappealed orders, grossly
understated the number of bargaining orders in their study period.
Wolkinson et al. collected data about the cases in their study group solely by contacting
union representatives. See id. By contrast, we contacted union representatives, employer
representatives and, in some cases, attorneys for both sides. This broader group of contacts
not only allowed us to obtain information about more cases, but also allowed us to check the
validity of information received from one side or another.
Finally, Wolkinson et al. include in their study group eight cases in which they assert that
Gissel orders "resulted from informal NLRB settlements." Id. at 514. We made no attempt to
identify cases in which employers agreed to bargain as a result of voluntary settlement of
unfair labor practice charges because we believed that such data have no place in a study of
the effectiveness of Gissel bargaining orders. Our interest was in assessing the effectiveness of
bargaining orders mandated by administrative or judicial orders. Cases in which employers
agree to bargain voluntarily as part of a settlement contribute little. when the settlement is
reached before hearing, it is not clear that the employer's alleged unfair labor practices, if
proven, would even have justified an order. Moreover, since the election may have been
delayed pending resolution of the unfair labor practice charges, it is not even clear that the
union would have lost the election, had one been held. In short, there has been no
determination by the Board that the employer has committed unfair labor practices or that
the unfair labor practices would have been sufficient to undermine the union's majority
status. Many representation cases include unfair labor practice charges and in most of those
cases the General Counsel negotiates with the respondent-employer about the action it is
willing to take to remedy an alleged violation. If the General Counsel has strong evidence of
majority status, it is hardly surprising that some employers agree to bargain and forsake the
administrative hearing process. But one must question whether the typical Gissel order
employer would so readily concede.
Other comparisons between our study and the Wolkinson et al. study appear at the
appropriate places in this article.
1997]
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We selected these four years principally for two reasons. First, we
knew that enforcement of NLRB unfair labor practice orders can
be time consuming, especially when one party seeks judicial review
of the Board's order.37 By selecting cases that were several years
old, we believed that all enforcement activity would be completed
and that the parties would have had sufficient time to bargain, if
bargaining was to occur. This assumption proved to be valid for all
but a few cases, in which judicial and administrative proceedings
dragged on for unusually long periods of time.
The second reason we chose the years in our study is because
they represent a time of transition for the NLRB2 s The criteria that
warrant issuance of a Gissel order have been the subject of much
debate among scholars and, to some extent, between the NLRB
and the courts.3 9 It is inaccurate, however, to think of the NLRB as
a stable body that applies neutral principles to particular fact situa-
tions. The members of the Board are appointed by the president to
staggered five year terms40 and, not surprisingly, the policies imple-
mented by a particular panel tend to reflect the social and economic
philosophy of the incumbent administration.41
Historically, panels appointed by Republican administrations
have been perceived as more partial to management, while those
appointed by Democrats have tended to favor unions. One might
surmise, then, that such predilections would affect the way in which
the panels apply Gissel bargaining order criteria. The study period
reflects a shift from so called liberal Board members (not all of
whom were appointed by Democratic presidents) to a conservative
panel dominated by Reagan appointees. We do not suggest that the
decisions rendered in the study period represent a perfect balance
between conservative and liberal majorities. They do, however,
demonstrate a period in which the political philosophy of the Board
members changed markedly. From 1979 into 1981 the Board was
37. See e-g., Benjamin W. Wolkinson et al., The Remedial Efficacy of Gissel Bargaining
Orders, 10 INDus. RErL L. J. 509, 517 (1988).
38. See Terry A. Bethel, Recent Decisions of the NLRB-The Reagan Influence, 60 IND.
L.J. 248, 248-54 (1985).
39. See id.
40. See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1994).
41. The staggered terms, however, often overlap into a change in administration,
meaning that appointees from two or more presidents might be on the Board at the same
time. Thus, the Board has seldom acted with unanimity in the development of controversial
policies.
[Vol. 14.423
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controlled by members who were perceived as favorable to labor's
interests. By the end of 1981, President Reagan had made appoint-
ments, which started to shift the balance of power. Reagan appoin-
tees controlled the Board by the end of 1982, a change that
prompted many reversals of Board policies and provoked an outcry
from organized labor.42
Our initial intent had been to select a representative sample of
Gissel orders issued during each of the four years of the study
period. Based largely on information included in NLRB Annual
Reports, we believed the Board issued more than 100 Gissel orders
each year. The 1979 report, for example, asserted that during the
fiscal year the Board initiated bargaining by remedial order in 138
cases.43 That number, however, included bargaining orders that
were unrelated to Gissel criteria.44 The number of Gissel orders
proved to be much smaller.
We began with the Classified Index of National Labor Relations
Board Decisions which lists Gissel order cases under the heading of
orders issued "To Remedy ULPs Which Preclude A Fair Elec-
tion."4 5 In order to cross check for accuracy, we ran a Lexis46 search
using a variety of word combinations, which produced a number of
decisions that had not been listed in the Classified Index. Ulti-
mately, we determined that the Board had issued 176 Gissel bar-
gaining orders during the study period.
We read each case and collected information which included the
unit description, the number of employees in the bargaining unit,
the nature of the business and its location, the strength of the
union's support as reflected by the number of authorization cards
signed by employees in the unit, the results of the election (if any)
and the kinds of unfair labor practices the employer committed. We
42. See Bethel, supra note 38, at 227 (giving a more thorough review of some of the
Reagan Board's more controversial decisions).
43. See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, FORTY-FOURTH ANN. REP. 274 tbl. 4
(1979).
44. See e.g., id. (discussing the 138 instances in which the board initiated bargaining by
remedial orders, including cases in which the union had won the election but the employer
refused to bargain).
45. NLRB, CLASSIFIED INDEX OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DECISIONS
AND RELATED COURT DECISIONS, 1977-1979, §§ 625-6612 (1979); NLRB, CLASSImD INDEX
OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DECISIONS Am RELATED COURT DECISIONS,
1980-1982, §§ 625-6612 (1982).
46. Lexis is a data base which includes all NLRB decisions issued since 1972.
19971
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also collected the date of the union's demand for recognition, the
date the election petition was filed (if any) and the date of the deci-
sion. We also Shepardized 7 each case to determine whether it had
been reviewed by the court of appeals.
Appellate review of NLRB decisions is not unusual. Board deci-
sions are not self executing.48 If there are doubts about employer
compliance, the General Counsel's only recourse is to seek enforce-
ment in the federal courts of appeals.49 Moreover, any party
adversely affected by a final order of the Board in an unfair labor
practice case may request review by the courts,50 an option that
employers sometimes elect, especially in fiercely contested cases
like those which lead to Gissel orders. Of the 176 cases in the study
period, the courts of appeals reviewed the Board's order in 108 or
about 61%. This would appear to be significantly higher than the
incidence of review for all unfair labor practice cases.5 1
We collected the appellate decisions affecting cases in the study
group and read each of them.52 When the courts ordered further
NLRB proceedings, we found those opinions and read them, as well
as any additional appellate opinions. In all, the courts refused
enforcement of the bargaining order in 32 cases, leaving a total of
47. Shepards Citations is a publication by Shepard's!McGraw-Hill, Inc. that identifies,
among other things, whether a case has been appealed and, if so, whether it was affirmed,
reversed or otherwise modified.
48. See Benjamin Wolkinson, The Remedial Efficacy of NLRB Remedies in Joy Silk
Cases, 55 CoNmLL L. Rnv. 26 (1969).
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1994).
50. See id. § 160(f).
51. It is difficult to speculate about the percentage of unfair practice orders that are
actually reviewed by the courts of appeals. The NLRB annual reports track the number of
cases decided each year, but they do not reveal how many of those cases are reviewed. The
annual reports do report the number of cases decided by the courts in a fiscal year, but the
delay inherent in judicial review means that most of those cases were handled by the Board
in previous fiscal years. About the most one can do is observe the number of cases decided
by the Board and the number of judicial decisions over a period of time. For example, in the
four year period of this study, the Board decided 4502 unfair labor practice cases. In that
same time period, the courts reviewed 1713 cases. If all of these numbers involved the same
cases, that would be a review rate of only 38%. But, as already noted, no such figures are
available. Nonetheless, these numbers indicate that the overall review rate is probably in the
40% range, meaning that Gissel order cases are more likely to be reviewed than most other
unfair labor practice cases.
52. Most of the opinions were available in the Federal Reporter, an official case
reporting service published by West Publishing Company. Some of the opinions were not
reported officially, but were available in the Labor Relations Reference Manual, a case
reporting service published by the Bureau of National Affairs. In a few cases, we obtained
the appellate opinion through a Freedom of Information Act Request to the NLRB.
[Vol. 14:423
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146 cases in which the Board's order should have resulted in collec-
tive bargaining. However, we elected to exclude two of those cases.
Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Gissel raised the possibility of
issuing Gissel orders in two different situations. Almost all of the
cases have involved the so called Gissel category two ("Gissel II")
orders. These are the cases in which the union must demonstrate
that it once had majority status before the Board will order the
employer to bargain as a remedy for unfair labor practices.5 3 In Gis-
sel, however, Chief Justice Warren seemed to say there could be
cases in which an employer's actions were so outrageous and perva-
sive that a bargaining order would be warranted, even if the union
never had majority support.54
Scholars have debated whether Warren's opinion should be read
to authorize Gissel category one ("Gissel I") orders.5 5 The Board,
however, steadfastly refused to issue a bargaining order in the
absence of a union majority until 1981, when it did so in response to
a directive from the Third Circuit.56 Subsequently, the Board
embraced Gissel I orders of its own volition and issued such an
order in its decision in Conair Corp. 7 In 1984, however, the Board
abandoned that position in Gourmet Foods, Inc.,5 8 disclaiming
either the power or the inclination to issue such orders.5 9
The only two Gissel I orders in the Board's history were issued
during the study period. Conair would have been excluded from the
53. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969).
54. The Court's discussion centered around a Fourth Circuit case in which the court
speculated that a bargaining order would be issued without a showing of majority status.
Chief Justice Warren said "[tihe actual area of disagreement between our position here and
that of the Fourth Circuit is not large as a practical matter." Id. at 613. The Court then said
that the Board had used a "similar policy" of issuing bargaining orders (a dubious
pronouncement) and concluded "[t]he only effect of our holding is to approve the Board's
use of the bargaining order in less extraordinary cases" in which a showing of majority status
is required. Id. at 614.
55. See eg., Daniel M. Carson, The Gissel Doctrine: When a Bargaining Order Will
Issue, 41 FoRD m L. REV. 85 (1972); Andrew A. Peterson, Of New Employees and Old
Violations: The Controversy over Changed Circumstances and Bargaining Orders, 8 EhMo.
REr- L.J. 52 (1982); David Stolow, Note, NLRB Bargaining Orders in the Absence of a Union
Majority, 26 N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 291 (1981); Stephen R. Wall, Note, Representative Bargaining
Orders: A 7Tne for Change, 67 CoiNmu L. Rlv. 950 (1982); Note, NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co.: Bargaining Orders and Employee Free Choice, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 318 (1970).
56. See United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 257 N.L.R.B. 772 (1981). The Third Circuit's
opinion is reported at 633 F.2d. 1054 (3d Cir. 1980).
57. 261 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1982), enforcement denied, 721 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
58. 270 N.L.R.B. 578 (1984).
59. See id.
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study in any event, since the D.C. Circuit refused to enforce the
bargaining order, meaning that there was no mandated collective
bargaining relationship. 6° We also elected to exclude United Dairy
Farmers61 from consideration because the Board no longer issues
such orders and our assumption is that inclusion of a non-majority
case might skew the results obtained by majority unions. Although
it would have been interesting to compare the experiences of Gissel
I and Gissel II unions, the dearth of Gissel I cases made such a
comparison impossible.62
60. Conair, 721 F.2d at 1355.
61. 257 N.L.R.B. 772.
62. We also made a few decisions about the cases to be included in our original pool of
176. For example, there were a few cases in which the union won the election but, because of
serious employer unfair labor practices, the Board also issued a bargaining order. These were
typically cases in which the election had already been held but the votes had not been
counted. The Board's order provided for certification in the event of a union victory and
assumed that a loss was attributable to the employer's unlawful conduct. Thus, the union
gained representative status either way.
We chose to exclude cases in which the union won the election, even if the employer's
conduct was otherwise serious enough to warrant a Gissel order. One of the principal
assumptions of a Gissel order is that the employer's unfair labor practices have undermined
the union's majority or otherwise made a fair election impossible. A primary focus of our
study is whether unions that lack a majority can muster sufficient employee support to
bargain successfully. Unions that have won an election face no such hurdle.
The Gissel order alternative does indicate that the employer has committed serious unfair
labor practices. These cases, however, are not necessarily distinguishable from other union
election victories following unlawful employer campaigns in which the union elected not to
file unfair labor practice charges. In short, our focus is on cases in which the Gissel order,
complete with its underlying assumptions about the erosion of majority status, is the only
method of securing bargaining rights.
We did, however, make one exception to this principle. There are some Gissel order cases
in which the employer also independently verified the union's majority status. See, e.g.,
Mazda of Anchorage, 253 N.L.R.B. 803 (1980); English Bros. Pattern & Foundry, 253
N.L.R.B. 530 (1980). Some cases have held that an employer which verifies a union's claim of
majority has no right to insist on an NLRB conducted election. See, e.g., Sullivan Elec. Co. v.
NLRB, 479 F.2d 1270 (6th Cir. 1973). Rather, the Board can issue a bargaining order based
on the employer's independent knowledge of majority status. See id. at 1272. Even though we
chose to exclude cases in which the union won an election but also received a bargaining
order, we decided to include cases where the bargaining order was based, alternatively, on
Gissel or on independent verification.
Under the NLRA, the election is an event of particular significance. A union that wins an
NLRB conducted election is certified as the exclusive representative and its majority status is
virtually unchallengeable for one year. See ARcmnALD Cox ET AL, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR
LAw 274 (11th ed. 1991). Our interest is in studying the success of unions that have not been
able to win an election, but have nonetheless secured bargaining rights. As applied in all but
two cases in the Board's history, a Gissel order requires that the union achieve majority
status at some point in its campaign, but assumes that the majority has been lost because of
the employer's unlawful conduct. In our view, it makes no difference if an employer verified
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Once we had established the pool of 144 cases in which bargain-
ing was possible, we ified a Freedom of Information Act63 request
with the NLRB seeking the names and addresses of the parties for
each of the cases and their counsel or other representatives. The
Board cooperated fully by furnishing this and all other public infor-
mation about the cases in the study group. We then developed a
questionnaire which requested information about the effect of the
Gissel order, including whether the parties had ever bargained; if
so, over what period of time; whether they had reached an agree-
ment and if so, would they furnish a copy; and whether the union
still had representative status. If the union no longer represented
the employees, we asked when and how it had lost that status,
whether through decertification, abandonment, selection of a differ-
ent representative or some other occurrence. Copies of the ques-
tionnaires are included as Appendix. We sent the questionnaire to
both union and employer representatives supplementing the origi-
nal requests by additional mailings and by telephone calls.
The purpose of our inquiry is to determine whether bargaining
order unions can successfully protect employee rights, as assumed
by the Supreme Court in Gissel. An initial problem is how to define
success. Some might argue that the imposition of the order itself is a
measure of success. By ordering the employer to bargain with the
union, the government has created a legal relationship that will be
regulated by statute. No matter how objectionable this might be to
the employer, it cannot merely walk away from the union.
There may be some significance to the remedial order, standing
alone. The purpose of the Gissel remedy, however, is not merely to
sanction the employer or to demonstrate the power of the govern-
ment. Rather, the Board's remedies are intended to undo the harm
caused by the employer's unlawful conduct. At least part of the
remedy's purpose then, is to secure lost opportunities for employ-
ees. A bargaining order which merely creates a formal relationship
between an employer and a union may be of some significance, but
such formalities are not the end envisioned by the Act.64 Rather,
the union's majority before it began its campaign to dissipate it. This situation differs
markedly from the election cases in which the union was able to maintain its majority in spite
of the employer's unfair labor practices.
63. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
64. See generally Note, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.: Bargaining Orders and Employee
Free Choice, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 318 (1970).
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the question is whether the union has been able to bargain effec-
tively on behalf of the employees.
The most obvious and least controversial measure of success is
whether the union was able to negotiate a collective bargaining
agreement. The purpose of the Act is to allow employees to choose
collective bargaining representatives to act on their behalf.65 Typi-
cally, unions provide such representation by negotiating contracts
that protect wages and other benefits and provide employment
security. We recognize that bargaining order unions may have less
leverage than majority unions and that the agreements they negoti-
ate might be inferior to those of majority unions. Nevertheless, exe-
cution of the agreement insures that the union will probably
maintain its majority status for the duration of the contract, thus
increasing the likelihood that the union's representative status will
endure.
Another measure of success could be whether there was ever any
bargaining between the employer and the union. Despite the
Board's order to bargain, some bargaining order unions never do,
apparently discouraged by the employer's tactics and the erosion of
employee support. In other cases, the union abandons the relation-
ship after only one or two meetings, during which, presumably, the
employer maintained its opposition to any meaningful negotiations.
There are cases, however, in which the parties bargain for several
months or longer, even though they never reach agreement on a
contract. One might argue that it is worth something for a union to
force a recalcitrant (and law-breaking) employer to the bargaining
table for an extended period, even if the negotiations are unsuccess-
ful. At least the employees would see that the law provided some
measure of protection to their effort to organize and bargain
collectively.
We are dubious that such a symbolic measure has much worth.
Despite the additional cost and time expenditure, the employer
ends up with a non-union workforce, the goal it hoped to achieve
through an unlawful campaign. Moreover, one might question
whether the employees could ever be persuaded to support another
organizational effort. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that a period
of extended bargaining could have some positive effects. In such
cases, the union has not simply walked away from the relationship.
65. See id
[VCol. 14.423
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Prolonged exposure at the bargaining table has some economic cost
to the employer and, while the employees do not benefit tangibly
from this expenditure, they witness their employer having to meet
with the union as a result of both union and government efforts.
Also, it is not necessarily the case that failure to reach agreement in
such circumstances is the result of employer intransigence or union
weakness. A significant percentage of elected unions also fail to
produce a collective bargaining agreement. Thus, to account for the
possibility that extended bargaining could be of some value, we
considered a secondary measure of success for those unions that
managed to force negotiations for a period of at least six months,
even though the negotiations did not produce an agreement.
m. REsULTs
One of the most interesting findings from this study has already
been discussed. Despite the attention given to Gissel bargaining
orders, and the body of scholarship produced on the subject, they
are relatively rare occurrences. In our four year study period, the
Board imposed a Gissel order in only 176 cases, or an average of 44
times a year. This is a minute number when one considers that, dur-
ing the same period, the Board decided 4502 unfair labor practice
cases. 66 The number is even smaller when it is reduced by the
orders not enforced in the Court of Appeals. When those 32 cases
are subtracted, only 146 remain. Furthermore, as explained above,
we reduced the number to 144 by excluding the Gissel I orders.
Of those 144, we were able to obtain information about 137
cases, which represents a 95% response rate.67 Table 1 reports our
findings concerning the success of bargaining order unions in nego-
tiating contracts. Discounting the three severance-only contracts, 68
66. The Board decided 1108 cases in fiscal 1982, 1028 in fiscal 1981, 1181 in fiscal 1980,
and 1185 in fiscal 1979. These numbers include a small number of back pay determinations,
jurisdictional disputes and supplemental proceedings. See NLRB, FORTY-FOURTH ANN. REP.
(1979); NLRB, FoRTY-FinF= ANN. REP. (1980); NLRB, FoRTY-SIr1 ANN. REP. (1981);
NLRB, FORTY-SEvENTH ANN. REP. (1982).
67. We were not able to obtain complete data in each case. Thus, in some of the results,
the number of cases will vary.
68. The severance-only contract means that the employer and union negotiated an
agreement concerning the effect on employees of the employer's decision to close. See, eg.,
Juuus G. GERMAN & BRTRAiN B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE BASIC PROCESSES,
LAW AND PRACnCE 117-19 (1988). Obviously, these are not traditional contract negotiations
since they will not establish terms and conditions of employment. Even heavily supported
elected unions often have diminished leverage in such negotiations since a strike threat has
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TABLE 1
CoNTRAcr vs. No CONTRACr
Did not reach agreement on contract 105
Negotiated at least 1 contract 29
Negotiated severance-only contract 3
Contract status unknown 7
TOTAL 144
only 29 unions were able to negotiate collective bargaining agree-
ments. This represents 21.2% of the number for which we have
information (137) and 20.1% of the total (144). This is to be com-
pared to Professor Cooke's study of the success rate of elected
unions, which covered some of the same time period. In contrast to
bargaining order unions, unions that were able to win an NLRB
conducted election bargained a first contract about 77% of the
time.69
Discouraging as these numbers are, it would still be a mistake to
claim that bargaining order unions achieved a lasting collective bar-
gaining relationship in one-fifth of all cases. Table 2 represents that
status of the study group as of early 1990, when data collection
ceased. Only 13 of the unions-or less than 10%-had retained
their representative status. In nearly one half the cases-45.8%-
the union abandoned the relationship, often with no or only mini-
mal negotiations. Although no single cause could be determined,
many union representatives complained that the delay, the
employer's conduct or some combination of the two, had eroded
the union's support so much that effective representation was no
longer possible.
An additional thirteen unions were decertified by the employees,
a number that might have increased had some unions not aban-
doned first. In addition, two bargaining order unions abandoned
the relationship after they had negotiated a first contract with the
little effect against an employer that plans to terminate operations anyway. Because of this
difference and because severance agreements often contain little consequence for employees,
the three severance-only agreements in the study cannot be equated with those cases in
which unions and employer bargained a collective bargaining agreement.
69. See WILLIAm N. Coocn, UNION ORGANIZING AND PUBLIC Poucy: FAILURE TO
SECURE FnSr CoNRrAcTs 84 (1985).
[V'ol. 14:423
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TABLE 2
STATUS OF BARGAINING ORDER UNIONS
Union still represents 13 9.0%
Union was decertified 11 7.6%
Union abandoned (no contract) 66 45.8%
Union abandoned after contract 2 1.4%
Employer withdrew recognition 1 0.7%
Employer closed 36 25.0%
Other 3 2.1%
Unknown 12 8.3%
TOTALS 144 100.0%
employer. The other cases are largely accounted for by employer
closures, which occurred in one quarter of all cases studied.
The results for our alternate measure of success-bargaining for
at least six months-appear somewhat brighter, at least at first
glance. Of the 113 cases for which we could secure data on this
issue, 38 or 33.6% said that bargaining lasted at least six months.
Obviously, this number overlaps significantly with cases in which
TABLE 3
Six MONTHS OR MORE OF BARGAINING
No 75 66.4%
Yes 38 33.6%
the parties actually reached a contract. Thus, if one combines both
measures of success, only 35.4% of the respondents report that they
either secured a contract or bargained for at least six months.
TABLE 4
SIX MONTHS OF BARGAnNNG OR CoNTRAcr
No 73 50.7%
Yes 51 35.4%
It would be a mistake, however, to claim "success" in 35% of
Gissel bargaining relationships. In the first place, as already sug-
1997]
HeinOnline  -- 14 Hofstra Lab. L. J. 439 1996-1997
Hofstra Labor Law Journal
gested, one might question whether unproductive bargaining is
really a success, no matter how long the union lingers. Equally
important, the six month measure is itself uncertain as it only
surveys elapsed time and not the quality of bargaining or even the
number of meetings, data that we could not obtain on a widespread
basis. There are, however, cases in which the union persisted for six
months or more even though it rarely met with the employer.
Although some unions did manage to bargain for a period of
time, many more never bargained at all. In over 40% of the of the
cases for which we have data, the union never sat down at the bar-
gaining table.
TABLE 5
No bargaining 56 41.2%
Some bargaining 80 58.8%
(Includes cases resulting in contracts)
In addition, other unions managed to bargain for less than a month,
sometimes encompassing only one or two sessions.
TABLE 6
NUMBER OF UNIONS THAT BARGAINED FOR MoRE THAN
ONE MONTH
One month or less 63 55.8%
More than one month 50 44.2%
(Includes bargaining that resulted in contract)
It is not enough to report raw numbers of success; dismal as the
numbers are, we wanted to identify circumstances in which unions
had succeeded, focusing principally on those relationships that had
produced a contract. Although the small number of contracts
achieved makes it difficult to generalize, we studied several vari-
ables to try and determine what factors, if any, contributed to the
likelihood of success. We also made certain assumptions about
which factors might lead to success, some of which were borrowed
from the conventional wisdom of labor lawyers and the NLRB. The
base assumption was that unions that enjoy the most support would
be most likely to negotiate a contract. As already noted, under the
principle of exclusive representation, a certified or recognized
[Vol. 14:423
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union bargains for all of the employees in the bargaining unit,
whether they support the union or not. Although sometimes not
articulated, a principal feature of the strength of a union's
employee support is the union's ability to mount a plausible strike
threat. A union that wins an election with a strong majority, for
example, can credibly claim in negotiations that it will recommend
a strike should the parties not reach an agreement. Even if the
union makes no express threat, it is reasonable to assume that
employers will view the size of the union's election majority as a
factor in predicting the possibility of a successful strike.
Bargaining order unions do not have a comparable claim to
majority status. They have either lost an election or have been
unwilling to brave one. Even so, they have some claim to employee
support, since the NLRB will not issue a bargaining order without
determining that the union once had a majority. Even if that major-
ity has been undermined by employer coercion, one might expect
that the employees' one-time support for the union could be a fac-
tor in its ability to negotiate a contract. The intervention of the
NLRB has, in theory, ameliorated some of the effects of the
employer's unlawful campaign. Consequently, maybe the sup-
pressed union support would resurface. If these assumptions are
valid, then the strength of the union's employee support should
influence the likelihood of success in bargaining a contract.
We recognize that employee support, standing alone, may not be
a valid predictor. Thus, we also studied other factors that could
affect both the support for the union and the effect of the
employer's conduct. One might assume, for example, that union
sympathists in large units might feel less visible to the employer
and, therefore, be less susceptible to employer pressure than
employees in small units. If this assumption is valid, then larger
units should enjoy more success than smaller ones.
Unit size and union strength are not the only variables that could
affect a union's chance of success. Other scholars have suggested
that employers benefit from the delay that sometimes attends
NLRB and related proceedings.70 The ordinary assumption is that
70. Professor Cooper's data indicated that the length of the delay between card signing
and election decreased the union's chance of success. See Laura Cooper, Authorization Cards
and Union Representation Selection Outcome: An Empirical Assessment of the Assumption
Underlying the Supreme Court's Gissel Decision, 79 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 87, 120 (1984). In
addition, Professor Weiler argues that "delay is fatal to the viability of a union organizing
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employee support for the union will erode over time, at least if the
union has not been able to act on the employees' behalf. This is
thought to be especially true when employee turnover is high. All
of the cases in the study spanned substantial time periods, with the
actual delay dependant on a variety of factors, including the length
of the administrative procedure, the existence of judicial proceed-
ings and, in some cases, a remand to the NLRB. Obviously, none of
the unions had representative status during the period of delay,
except for those cases in which the employers delayed bargaining
even after all legal avenues were exhausted. Given the possibility of
employee turnover, one might expect, then, that the longer the
delay between the demand for recognition (which is when most
unions had a card-based majority) and the enforcement of the
order, the less the likelihood of success.
The intensity of the employer's unlawful campaign might also
influence the union's success. This assumption is consistent with the
basic theory of Gissel, which is that unlawful employer tactics will
undermine employee support for the union. It is difficult to assess
the severity of an employer's campaign. Moreover, our review of
the study group makes it impossible for us to generalize about when
the Board will find that its Gissel criteria have been satisfied.
Merely counting the number of unfair labor practices in a case is
not particularly revealing. Some offenses are trivial, isolated, and
affect relatively few employees. One measure, however, is to count
the number of serious unfair labor practices occurring in the cam-
paign. We did this by tallying the number of "hallmark" violations
in each case.71 We also paid special attention to certain serious vio-
lations which the Board assumes are particularly egregious, like dis-
criminatory discharge and threat of plant closure.
None of these factors stand in isolation. Obviously, factors such
as delay and union strength are related. Units with high levels of
employee support may be less affected by employer intransigence.
Similarly, if one assumes that small units are more vulnerable to
employer threats, it seems equally reasonable to believe that the
intensity of the employer's campaign will compound the effect. Our
drive." Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under
the NLRA, 96 HAav. L. REv. 1769, 1793 (1983).
71. The hallmark unfair labor practices are discriminatory discharge, threat of discharge,
promise of benefit, grant of benefit and threat of closure or closure. See NLRB v. Jamaica
Towing, 632 F.2d 208, 212-13 (2d Cir. 1980).
[V/ol. 14:423
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examination, then, focuses not merely on individual factors but also
on interactions among potential influences.
In order to make our findings understandable to the widest possi-
ble audience, we will summarize them without reference to the sci-
entific method, using tables where appropriate. It is important to
note that we use multi-variable methods so that the influence of
factors can be considered without any confounding from other
factors.
A. Size of the Unit
There were few large units in the study group. Because the aver-
age NLRB bargaining unit tends to be small,72 we considered all
units in excess of 100 employees as large. Using that definition, the
results are consistent with our assumption. That is, holding other
factors constant, larger bargaining units are more successful than
smaller units, a conclusion that holds true using either definition of
success.
TABLE 7
AVERAGE SIZE
Average size of unit with contract 115.5
Average size of unit without contract 40.3
Average size over 6 mos. bargaining 87.9
Average size less 6 mos. bargaining 37.4
Thus, a union was more likely to bargain a contract in units of
more than 100 employees than in smaller units. This may suggest
that employees in larger units feel less vulnerable to employer retal-
iation or are more secure about maintaining their anonymity, thus
72. In fiscal 1981, for example, one of the years in the study group, the Board conducted
representation elections (not counting decertification elections) in 6656 bargaining units
among a total employee population of 403,837 employees, which is an average of just over 60
employees per unit. See NLRB, FORTY-SIXTH ANN. REP., tbl. 13 (1981). Table 17 of the same
report indicates that all elections were conducted in units of fewer than 59 employees. See id.
Similar figures exist for the other years in the study group. Thus, in fiscal 1979, 73.7% of the
elections were conducted in units of 59 or fewer employees; in fiscal 1980 the number was
75.4%; and in fiscal 1982 the number was 75.8%. See NLRB, FORTY-FouRTH ANN. REP., tbl.
17 (1979); NLRB, FoRTY-Fnm- ANN. REP., tbl. 17 (1980); NLRB, FoRTY-SEvFNTrI ANN.
REP., tbl. 17 (1982).
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reducing the likelihood that the employer will retaliate against
them personally. But it might also suggest that employees in large
units are less sensitive to their employer's desires or concerns about
unionization, whether expressed lawfully or not. Larger work
places, for example, might simply be more impersonal, making it
less likely that employees would heed employer calls to stay non-
union.
One problem with attributing Gissel union success to employer
size is that size appears to have little effect in smaller units. If
unions succeed in large units because employees feel less
threatened, then one might assume that size would have exactly the
opposite effect in very small units. Units with fewer than 100
employees were less successful, but once membership dipped below
100, size had no impact. That is, the union's probability of success
did not diminish in proportion to size. Once units reached 25
employees or smaller, size alone had no impact at all.
Size does seem to matter, however, when other factors are added,
at least in smaller units. The probability of success does not change
in units over 100 no matter what other variables are added. In
smaller units, however, the union's probability of success increased
if the employer had threatened employees with retaliatory dis-
charge. This seems counter-intuitive. The NLRB regards the threat
of discharge as an egregious violation and has often commented
that employees are particularly sensitive to threats of job loss.73
This effect would seem to be exacerbated in small units, where
employees are less assured that their union sympathies can remain
secret. If employer coercion actually affects employees, one might
assume that a threat of discharge in a small unit would decrease the
union's chance of success. The employees would be frightened away
from the union and unwilling to lend it their support.
The contrary result might be explained in a variety of ways. It
may be, as Getman, Goldberg and Herman ("Getman et al.") sug-
gested, that some unlawful campaign practices actually have little
impact on employees.74 Of course, the contrary might also be true.
That is, the employees might have taken the threat of discharge
seriously and turned to the union for protection. That hypothesis
73. See Juiuus G. GTmAN m A., UNION REPRESENTATION ELETIcONS: LAW Arm
REALrrY 14 (1976).
74. See id. at 113-6.
[Vol. 14:423
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seems supported by the fact that the threat of discharge affected
union success only in small units. Faced with a hostile employer,
employees in small units, who cannot hope for anonymity or group
strength, turn to the union as their only source of protection.
The effect of threat of discharge, however, seems undermined by
the fact that a threat of plant closure had no impact, regardless of
the size of the bargaining unit. Like threat of discharge, the NLRB
assumes that employees are particularly sensitive to employer
threats to close the business and thereby terminate employment.75
The presence of such threats, then, would seem to undermine
employee support for the union and diminish its chance of negotiat-
ing an agreement. These contrary results are consistent with
Getman et al. conclusion that employees are not affected by such
threats.76 However, it may be that employees are affected by
threats, but that they simply discount employer threats to close
their business. A business closure, after all, affects the employer's
livelihood, as well as that of the employees. It seems reasonable,
then, to interpret the data as suggesting that employees take seri-
ously a threat of individual discharge but will discount a threat to
close the plant and fire everyone.77
B. Delay
Despite the conventional wisdom of lawyers and the NLRB, and
in spite of data suggesting that delay works to an employer's advan-
tage in election cases, it seems to have no effect on the likelihood
75. See ia at 14.
76. See iL
77. Our data suggest that employees might well be skeptical of threats to close.
Although the employer ceased operations in a full 25% of the cases studied, the employer's
threat to do so is not an accurate predictor of that action. The employer threatened to close
in just over 58% of the cases, as demonstrated in the following table:
TABLE 8
THREAT OF CLOsURE
Threat Frequency Percent
No 60 41.7
Yes 84 58.3
We were unable to determine what happened in twelve of the cases. Using the 132 cases for
which we have information, 77 threatened to close and 55 did not. Of those who made the
threat 24 or about 31% closed; of those who did not make the threat 12 or about 22% closed.
Although the percentage is higher for those who made the threat, the differences in percent-
ages are not statistically significant. The data do not indicate that the closure was motivated
by the organizational effort.
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that a bargaining order union will negotiate a contract. That is,
when the delay is measured from the time of demand for recogni-
tion to the time when all administrative and judicial delays are
exhausted, the length of the interval seems not to affect a union's
chance for success. A union experiencing a long delay before bar-
gaining begins is no less likely to succeed than a union that begins
bargaining shortly after the bargaining order.
TABLE 9
DELAY
No Contract (incl. sev. only) Contract
(n=107) (n=29)
Average 968.1 days 1096.8 days
Delay (from 290-2019 days) (from 364-2580 days)
It is no easy matter to explain why delay is not a factor in the
union's success, especially since it does seem to matter when the
union seeks certification through an election. It may be that the
strength of bargaining order unions remains constant, regardless of
the delay. That is, there may be some hard core supporters who are
not threatened by employer coercion and whose enthusiasm for the
union does not dim over time. This would mean that a union's abil-
ity to gain enough support to negotiate successfully is not depen-
dent on whether the employer can delay the onset of bargaining.
This hypothesis, however, is inconsistent with one of the most com-
monly assumed consequences of delay, which is turnover in the bar-
gaining unit.
We were not able to obtain employee turnover data from the
employers. All we have is anecdotal evidence, which consists of sev-
eral comments by union organizers who attributed their failure to
bargain a contract to the disappearance of their supporters through
turnover. We recognize that employee turnover may have just been
proffered as an excuse and that other factors might also have con-
tributed to the union's failure. Nevertheless, many of the cases
dragged on for years, with the average delay from demand to an
effective bargaining order of almost three years. Moreover, many of
the bargaining units did not employ craftsmen or skilled laborers. It
seems reasonable to assume, then, that the delay contributed to the
appearance of new faces in the bargaining unit, none of which had
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been part of the union's original majority. Moreover, while the
employers could not lawfully ask about union sympathies when
they hired the new workers, it seems safe to assume that they would
avoid hiring new employees who had previous experience with
unions.
It may be that the data mean just what they show, which is that
delay does not matter. To the extent that some bargaining order
unions are able to bargain contracts and build lasting relationships,
their success does not depend on the length of time an employer is
able to delay the onset of bargaining. It may also be, however, that
delay is not relative. That is, as compared to election cases, there
was a substantial delay in all of the cases in the study group. The
least amount of time that expired between the demand and the
point where bargaining was required was 290 days and the average
was almost three years. By contrast, in the typical election case,
there is only a few months between the union's demand and its cer-
tification. It may be, then, that whatever damage is done by delay
has already occurred by the time a Gissel bargaining obligation
arises and that further delay does not increase the effect.
C. Support for the Union
The typical assumption in collective bargaining is that unions that
enjoy high levels of support can make the most credible strike
threat and, accordingly, will have more clout at the bargaining
table. Gissel order unions should have no such advantage. Some of
them have already lost an election and, the Board assumes, the
employer's unlawful conduct has frightened most employees away
from the union. In theory, however, the Gissel order should restore
employee confidence in the union. Thus, one might assume that the
level of employee support prior to the employer's unlawful cam-
paign would offer some prediction of the union's success in negotia-
tion after issuance of the order. That is, if employee support was
undermined by the employer's unfair labor practices (and not by
genuine disaffection with the union) that support should resurface
when the government acts to protect employees through the issu-
ance of the bargaining order. One might expect, then, that those
unions that bargained a contract would be those that enjoyed the
most support prior to the unlawful campaign.
It is not easy to determine precise levels of employee support. As
noted earlier, the Board determines support for the union by count-
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ing the number of signed authorization cards, a measure approved
by the Supreme Court in Gissel,78 despite claims about problems
with cards. We recognize that some employees might sign authori-
zation cards out of fear or in order to buy peace; but it may also be
that some union supporters refrain from signing out of fear of
employer retaliation. Despite the fact that the use of cards is imper-
fect, we think it is justifiable to measure employee support with the
same yardstick used by the Board not only in Gissel but also in
voluntary recognition cases.
Obviously, each union in the study had majority support at one
time, with the level rnning from 50.8% favoring the union to 100%
(in very small units). The average level of support was 67.4% which,
interestingly, is close to the level at which Cooper found unions had
an even chance of winning an election.7 9 Contrary to our assump-
tions, the data indicate that this level of support is not a reliable
predictor of a Gissel union's ability to bargain a contract. Indeed,
the level of support was slightly higher in unsuccessful units, though
the difference is not significant.80
TABLE 10
No Contract Contract
Average Level of Support 68.3% 65.8%
Perhaps these data are not all that surprising. In the first place,
Cooper's figures indicate that, had these cases gone to an election,
the union would have lost about half of them, meaning that the
authorization card count is not a particularly accurate method of
judging the strength of a union's support. If the cards did accurately
measure employee support, the Gissel order obviously did not suffi-
ciently reassure employees, who remained reluctant to voice sup-
port for the union after the employer's unlawful campaign. It could
also be that employers in the study, who had displayed a willingness
to violate the law to remain non-union, were not intimidated by a
78. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 601-10 (1969).
79. See Cooper, Authorization Cards and Union Representation Outcome: An Empirical
Assessment of the Assumption Underlying the Supreme Court's Gissel Decision, 79 Nw. U. L.
REv. 87, 119 (1984).
80. See id. at 115-18.
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union's strike threat, no matter what the level of employee sup-
port."' Such employers may have been more resistant to a contract,
even in those units where the union had once enjoyed strong
support.
It is probably also true that level of employee support prior to the
unlawful campaign does not mean much standing alone. Authoriza-
tion card counts, after all, reveal the sympathies of individual
employees, some of whom disappear as a case lingers in the admin-
istrative and judicial process. Thus, we considered whether the vari-
ables of delay and employee support taken together revealed an
effect on a bargaining order union's probability of success. How-
ever, just as neither variable made a difference standing alone, they
did not increase a union's chance of success when looked at in com-
bination. A union's level of support was not significant no matter
how short or long the delay. It is worth noting, however, that there
were no short delays in this study. The average lag time between
demand and effective order was just under a thousand days and the
shortest delay was 290 days or almost 10 months. It may be, then,
that whatever impact delay would have on a union's level of sup-
port had already occurred.
D. Unfair Labor Practices
We assumed that the union's chance of success would decrease as
the severity of the employer's unlawful conduct increased. Interest-
ingly, this proved not to be the case. We acknowledge that there is
some difficulty assessing how serious an employer's violations are.
We believe, however, that identifying those campaigns which
included more than one of the so-called hallmark violations was a
justifiable method of identifying particularly flagrant campaigns.
Even so, no matter how we counted the unfair labor practice and
no matter what groupings of violations we made, there is no evi-
dence that unions were less successful when the campaign was more
outrageous.
Nor was the severity of the employer's campaign relevant when
we combined it with the size of the bargaining unit. This is true
despite our assumption that employer threats might be taken more
seriously by employees in small units. Similarly, there was no evi-
81. See id. at 117.
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TABLE 11
No
Contract Contract
% w/ discriminatory discharge 72.9% 65.5%
% w/ threat to close 59.8% 48.3%
% w/ threat of discharge 48.6% 58.6%
% w/ promise of benefit 57.9% 51.7%
% w/ grant of benefit 36.4% 58.6%
dence of effect when we combined the seriousness of the unfair
labor practices and the size of the union's majority.
That does not mean, however, that the data show no effect from
particular unfair labor practices. In both large and small units, the
presence of a promise of benefits made it less likely that the union
would succeed. Conversely, the actual grant of benefits made it
more likely that the union would succeed. This latter phenomenon
might be explained by assuming that employees credit the union
with the receipt of benefits, and are, therefore, more likely to sup-
port its bargaining efforts on their behalf. If the level of employee
support following the bargaining order is the determinant for union
success, then it is not clear why the promise of benefit hurts the
union. It may be that such promises convince employees to forsake
the union and rely on the employer's beneficence. If that is true,
however, then one has to wonder why they fail to make the same
decision when employers actually give them benefits.
As noted above, a threat of discharge seems to have some impact
on the union's success when such threats are made in small units.
Interestingly, however, the actual presence of a discriminatory dis-
charge during a campaign seems to have no effect at all, regardless
of the size of the unit. This result seems counter to the conventional
wisdom that discriminatory discharge is the most serious threat to
employee concerted action. It may be, however, that the coercive
effect of an egregious campaign affects employees, whether or not
anyone has been fired.
Nor do these conclusions change when one combines other vari-
ables, with one exception already mentioned. As reported above,
the union was more likely to bargain a contract in cases where the
employer made a threat of discharge in small units. Otherwise,
however, the presence of unfair labor practices in combination with
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each other or grouped with other variables made no difference in
the probability of success.
We also considered a different measure of severity as another
study suggested that unions were more likely to bargain a contract
after less serious campaigns. Cases involving discriminatory dis-
charge typically involve section 8(a)(3); however, less serious viola-
tions are considered only under section 8(a)(1). Thus, we looked at
whether a bargaining order union had a better chance of success if
the employer committed only 8(a)(1) violations, a comparison also
used by Wolkinson et al. In their study, Wolkinson et al. concluded
that unions were successful 80% of the time when the employer
committed only 8(a)(1) violations, though their sample size was
quite small.82 They found only five such cases. 3 By comparison, our
data include forty cases in which there were only violations of sec-
tion 8(a)(1). In contrast to Wolkinson et al., our data indicate no
significant difference in the success rate of unions where the
employer violated only section 8(a)(1). Unions bargained a contract
in 25% of those cases which is about the same as the overall success
rate.
Our results are not surprising in light of our finding that a dis-
criminatory discharge generally has no effect on a union's success
rate. Although section 8(a)(1) does encompass some less serious
violations like interrogation or impression of surveillance, it also
includes serious acts. For example, the hallmark violations of threat
of discharge, promise of benefit, grant of benefit and threat of clo-
sure all violate section 8(a)(1). Therefore, merely sorting cases by
the type of violation does not help predict success.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Gissel Bargaining order extracts significant costs and pro-
vides relatively few rewards. Professor Cooke's study of elected
unions in 1979 and 1980 (two of the years included in our study)
found that unions that won an election were able to bargain a first
contract about 77% of the time.84 By contrast, the Gissel order
unions in our study group achieved a contract only 20% of the time
82. See Benjamin W. Wolkinson et al., The Remedial Efficacy of Gissel Bargaining
Orders, 10 INDus. REt L. 509, 515 (1988).
83. See id.
84. See William N. Cooke, The Failure to Negotiate First Contracts: Determinants and
Policy Implications, 38 INDus. & LAB. PEr REv. 163, 173-74 (1984).
19971
HeinOnline  -- 14 Hofstra Lab. L. J. 451 1996-1997
Hofstra Labor Law Journal
and, even if one makes the dubious assumption that mandated bar-
gaining reaps some benefits, such unions are able to maintain a bar-
gaining relationship for more than six months in only about 35% of
cases. As the Board's most drastic remedial step, then, the Gissel
order is an abject failure. Employers who are determined to remain
non-union have a reasonably good chance of doing so. Although
the cost may have some deterrent effect on some employers, that
provides little relief for the employees whose employers have used
the process to defeat the union. Ironically, then, the most the Board
can claim for its most vaunted remedy is the possibility of just the
kind of effect it eschews. It provides some punishment, but even
that is scant deterrent to employers willing to pay the price.
We were not surprised to learn that Gissel bargaining orders are
ineffective, a result that was suggested by some earlier work and
that, in any event, seems consistent with common sense. If, as is
commonly believed, a union's strength influences its ability to
mount a credible strike threat and if the strike is the oil that lubri-
cates the machine of collective bargaining, it is hardly surprising
that a weak union will negotiate poorly. We had hoped, however,
that our data would yield one of two results. We speculated that,
though Gissel orders seldom worked, they might be most effective
in the most egregious cases. If employer speech and conduct really
do threaten employees, then we thought that, paradoxically, the
worst cases might produce the best chance of success. These cases,
after all, would involve employees who did not merely change their
minds about the union but, rather, were scared away from it. We
speculated that, once the cowed employees saw their lawbreaking
employer restrained by powerful government action, perhaps carry-
ing the sanction of a federal appellate court, they would be free
once again to support their union. Perhaps it works that way,
though our data fail to show any correlation between seriousness of
the unfair labor practices and the union's probability of success.
Alternatively, we had hoped that our data would allow us to
speculate intelligently about the conditions under which a Gissel
bargaining order would most likely succeed. Perhaps the most per-
sistent criticism of NLRB Gissel policy is the difficulty in determin-
ing the criteria that must exist to warrant issuance of an order.
Whatever the merits of the Board's refusal to articulate such stan-
dards, we had hoped that we could provide some guidance about
the circumstances in which success seemed most likely, data that
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might prove useful to the Board in deciding whether to issue an
order. We cannot. To the contrary, the prediction of whether cer-
tain factors will lead to successful bargaining can be made just as
well by flipping a coin.
Although not always acting on the basis of reliable data, other
scholars, too, have speculated that Gissel orders are ineffective and,
in the best tradition of law reviews, have proposed law reform to
alleviate the problem. Wolkinson et al. urges that the situation can
be remedied if unions are able to choose replacements for employ-
ees fired during an organizational campaign. 85 Professor Weiler's
proposal also focuses on the harm done during the campaign, but
offers a different solution. Because he doubts the Board's ability to
undo the effects of the employer's unlawful tactics, he proposes, in
effect, that the campaign be eliminated. Or, at least, that the
employer's participation be sharply curtailed. He proposes "instant
elections" based on the Canadian model, which would cut short the
employer's opportunity to respond to a union's card signing
campaign. 86
The Wolkinson proposal to allow unions to hire replacement
workers does not warrant serious comment. Fair or not, much of
American labor law is premised on the employer's ability to control
the work place and even the National Labor Relations Act does not
limit an employer's freedom to hire, absent proof of anti-union dis-
crimination. Even then, the Board has never claimed the power to
delegate hiring decisions to an outside party. The most it has done
is to require the employer to hire or reinstate specific individuals
who have been the targets of unlawful discrimination. There is no
reason to believe that the Board's remedial power is sufficient to
encompass an order allowing the union to make hiring decisions.
85. See Benjamin W. Volkinson et al., The Remedial Efficacy of Gissel Bargaining
Orders, 10 INus. RE. L.J. 509, 523-27 (1989).
86. See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HAv. L. REv. 1769,1805 (1983). This proposal, of course, assumes that
the employer has not become aware of the campaign early in the process, since early
cognizance would allow the employer to begin its campaign before the union even had a card
majority. In Gissel itself, Chief Justice Warren observed that employers know about card
signing campaigns early because unions "normally" inform employers of them. See NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 603 (1969). The Chief Justice did not support this assertion
with data and, in fact, there is no supporting empirical evidence. In contrast, Getman et al.
found that employers typically did not know about the union's efforts until they received a
demand for recognition. See Gnm-A Er AL., UNroN REPREsENTATON EIrectioNs: LAW
AND REALIT= 135 (1976).
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Nor is it realistic to believe that congress would amend the Act to
give the Board power to control employer hiring decisions.
In addition to their other proposals, both Wolkinson et al. and
Weiler propose that the Board make expanded use of its power to
seek injunctions under section 10(j). We have no quarrel with
these proposals. Indeed, such action is particularly desirable in sec-
tion 8(a)(3) discriminatory discharge cases. No one questions the
debilitating impact discharge has on individual employees and there
is significant evidence that the Board's ordinary remedies do not
provide adequate relief. Moreover, there is at least some evidence,
in our study and Wolkinson's, that early reinstatement provides
assurances to the remaining employees. 88 Although the Board has
traditionally shied away from section 100), the current Board
Chairman and General Counsel have expressed a willingness to use
it.89
87. See Wolkinson et al., supra note 85, at 527-28; Weiler, supra note 86, at 1799-1801.
88. See Wolkinson et al., supra note 85, at 516 (finding that in bargaining units where all
or some of the reinstated employees returned to work, unions succeeded 44% of the time).
Our data show a success rate of about 40%, or almost double the overall rate.
89. See WnmLLM B. GouLD IV, AGENDA FOR RFORm, 161 (1993). Prior to his
appointment as NLRB Chairman, William Gould discussed the use of 10(j), stating that "[i]t
warrants attention, perhaps in the form of more rigorous guidelines that exhort the Board to
seek injunctive relief." Id.
Shortly after his appointment, Gould made the following remarks concerning the increased
use of 10(j):
One other area is of vital importance. Since my first day on the job on March 14, I
have signed 24 requests for temporary injunctive relief. If the National Labor
Relations Act redeems its statutory promise of freedom of association and the
promotion of collective bargaining, prompt relief must be available under
appropriate circumstances. The General Counsel, in May, made requests of the
Board for authorization to institute discretionary injunctive proceedings under
Section 100) of the Act in 14 cases-this is the highest number of requests in a
single month made by the General Counsel to the Board since 10(j) was enacted in
1947.
Remarks of NLRB Chairman Gould to the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) 111 (June 13, 1994).
At a labor law conference in October 1994, NLRB General Counsel Fred Feinstein cited
statistics indicating that "[ijn fiscal 1994 there were 82 such [100)] cases, an all time record,
and 67 of them were in the second half of the year, since he assumed the general counsel
position." NLRB Officials Outline Goals for Speeding up Agency Actions, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) 202 (Oct. 21, 1994). Feinstein also noted that "[w]hile the board is seeking 100)
injunctions at four to five times the previous rate, its success rate of 80 percent to 90 percent
has not changed." Id. At this same conference, Board member Margaret A. Browning stated
that the Board felt that the use of Section 100) was "warranted and appropriate" and that
"[e]very request for 10(j)... has been approved by the Board." Id.
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Even with section 100) relief, however, the outlook for Gissel
bargaining orders is hardly auspicious. The orders seldom work the
way the Board hopes they will and employees' rights are protected
only infrequently and, apparently, randomly. This is not solely the
Board's fault. It lacks the power to sanction even blatant law viola-
tors and its attempts to use its restorative powers creatively have
often been slapped down by courts of appeal.90 It is fair to observe,
however, that the Board has sometimes resisted judicial invitations
to expand the scope of its remedial authority.91
Although we agree with proposals to strengthen the Board's
hand, we also question the utility of such reform scholarship. Law
review articles that suggest amendment to the NLRA no doubt
serve their purpose of fostering debate among scholars, but they do
little to influence the law. Although the original Wagner Act has
been amended several times since its inception in 1935, the amend-
ments have curtailed, not strengthened, the power of unions.92
Feinstein also stated, in a 1994 fiscal year-end report, that "I have made the increased use
of Section 10(j) injunctive proceedings a cornerstone of my administration of the Act."
NLRB Cites Successes, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 12, 1994, at A16. During Feinstein's first seven
months in office,
the board approved 65 of the 83 Sec. 10j) injunctions that it authorized for the
entire fiscal year. Of the 83 authorized, 62 petitions actually were filed. The agency
was successful in 30 of 36 emergency proceedings that were resolved as of Sept. 30
[1994]. The NLRB authorized between 26 and 42 Sec. 10(0) injunctions annually
between 1990 and 1993.
Id.
As of June 1995, this increased use of section 10(j) had continued. During 1994-95, the
Board "authorized requests for more than federal 125 injunctions, triple the rate of the past
decade." Robert L. Rose, The Enforcers: Federal Labor Board Gets More Aggressive, To
Employers Dismay, vALL ST. J., June 1, at Al.
90. See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 197 U.S. 99 (1970) (reversing the Board's
remedy and forcing an employer to agree to a union proposal for a check off clause, though
not disagreeing with a Board finding that the employer had refused to concede the clause
merely to frustrate a collective bargaining agreement.); Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers v.
NLRB, 502 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (rebuffing the Board's effort to require an employer to
pay the NLRB's litigation costs), enforcing in part, 194 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1972).
91. See, eg., Electrical, Radio & Mach. Workers, 502 F.2d 349; Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185
N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), enforcement denied, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In these cases, the
Board resisted the Court of Appeals' declaration that the Board had the power to award
make-whole relief in refusal to bargain cases. See Gourmet Foods, 270 N.L.R.B. at 213 (1984)
(disclaiming the power to issue Gissel I bargaining orders, despite an earlier court of appeals
opinion to the contrary); United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054 (3d Cir.
1980).
92. The Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947 created the first unfair labor practices against
unions including, inter alia, a ban on secondary boycotts, a limitation on recognitional
picketing and, significantly, an amendment to section 7 which provided that employees had
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Moreover, while speculation about labor law reform may be useful,
it hardly seems practical. The last significant attempt at labor law
reform-which would have strengthened both unions and NLRB
power-failed in 1978, when democrats controlled both the con-
gress and the White House. There is no prospect for such reform in
the current political climate.
Even if there was, one might question whether stronger NLRB
remedies would have significant effect. Scholars-and unions-
have assumed that much of labor's decline can be attributed to lax
enforcement and doctrinal shifts by the NLRB. It seems reasonable
to suggest that individual employees would be better served by
swift administration of unfair labor practice charges and by aggres-
sive enforcement of NLRB remedies. But there is scant evidence
that the Board action can deter or negate contentious employers
who are determined to resist unions with unlawful means. During
the Reagan administration, much was made of the NLRB's con-
servative tilt and, not surprisingly, labor blamed some of its
problems on those policies. The truth is that labor's slide in the pri-
vate sector started before Reagan's election and it has not abated
during a democratic-and presumably friendlier-administration. 93
the right to refrain from union activity. This change has been explained as marking a shift in
government attitude from one that encouraged unionization to one of neutrality. See Taft-
Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 140 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168
(1994)).
The 1959 amendments closed several "loopholes" in the secondary boycott provisions and
significantly curtailed a union's right to picket for recognition. See Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub.
L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 525, 542-45 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1994)).
The last significant amendment, in 1974, removed the exemption for non-profit hospitals.
See Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395, 396 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168
(1994)). Although this increased the scope of union activity protected by the NLRA, it was
supported by industry groups who sought federal regulation of hospital labor relations.
93. The percentage of the private sector workforce represented by unions has been
declining steadily for many years, and has not abated since Reagan and Bush left office. In
1995, union membership stood at 10.4%. See Union Membership Declines in 1995 to 16.4
Million, A 300,000 Drop, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at d-19 (Feb. 12,1996). The number
was 11.5% in 1992, when President Clinton took office. See Proportion of Union Members
Declines to Low of 15.8%, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at b-3 (Feb. 9, 1993). (Note - the
15.8 percent figure in the title reflects public and private sector). The level was 13% in the
private sector in 1988. See Union Membership Declines to 16.8 Percent of Workers in 1988,
BLS Survey Shows, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at b-1 (Jan. 30, 1989). Professor Weiler
claims that the level was just over 20% in 1980. See Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing
Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. Rnv. 1769, 1818 (1983).
He also says that the level stood at 24% during the Carter administration in 1978. See id.
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Professors Getman et al. suggest that the kinds of activity that
lead to Gissel orders actually have little effect on employees,94 a
conclusion rejected by both Weiler and Wolkinson. Wolkinson
ignores Getman et al. entirely, though Weiler uses their data and a
different methodological approach to draw exactly the opposite
conclusions.95 Our data is consistent with both arguments. Thus, if a
union's majority was not lost because of the adverse effects of
employer unlawful conduct, then NLRB remedies would not
restore the majority. Rather, the employees would have abandoned
the union for their own reasons and they would not return merely
because the Board imposes the union as their bargaining agent. It
could also be, of course, that the employer's action did intimidate
the employees and that the Board's efforts have not persuaded
them that it is safe to return to the fold.
In either case, one must question the continued efficacy of the
Gissel remedy. Perhaps the Board should continue to issue Gissel
orders for whatever deterrent value they may hold for employers
on the margin. But the NLRB should stop pretending that such
orders can create effective collective bargaining relationships and,
importantly, unions should not rely on them in their effort to organ-
ize hostile employers. This is not, in short, a problem that can be
easily solved by the law. In fact, neither of the NLRB's two most
important remedies, the Gissel bargaining order or reinstatement,
actually does much to protect workers.
Rather than look to NLRB intervention, unions must develop
their own strategies to counter the effects of egregious employer
conduct. The new head of the AFL-CIO promises a renewed
emphasis on organizing, one area in which unions have slipped in
recent years.96 Labor leaders have watched their traditional
94. See GErMAN ET AL, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONs: LAW AND REALrry 119-
20 (1988).
95. See Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under
the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1769, 1786 (1983). "Ironically, then, the raw data that Getman
and his coauthors so carefully gathered point to precisely the opposite conclusion from the
one they drew. A protracted representation campaign, punctuated by discriminatory
discharges and other reprisals against union supporters, can have a pronounced effect on the
ultimate election verdict." Id.
96. Se4 eg., Stuart T. Silverstein, Sweeney, A 'New Voice,' Elected to Lead AFL-CIO,
L.A. Trms, Oct. 26, 1995, at A14.
To enliven organizing throughout the AFL-CIO, [President John] Sweeney has
proposed spending $20 million a year on such efforts, roughly 30% of the
federation's budget. Among other things, he wants to expand the operations of the
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strongholds disappear or "downsize" and have not responded well
with convincing appeals to non-traditional and high tech industries.
Merely spending money on advertising and training younger
organizers, however, will not be enough to deal with employers who
are bent on avoiding unions at all costs. Rather, unions must meet
such hostility with aggressive tactics of their own. No one suggests
that this will be easy. The right to replace economic strikers97-and
the increased willingness to use it-limits the extent to which
unions can use their most traditional weapon, the strike. And there
is no real likelihood that Congress will act to undo the effects of this
rule.
98
It may be, however, that other weapons are under-utilized. A
union with a genuine majority, for example, could strike for recog-
nition.99 Outside the health care industry, unions need give no
notice before striking. If, as Getman et al. found, employers are
typically unaware of organizational activity,100 a recognition strike
AFL-CIO's Organizing Institute, a training school for organizers, and establish an
office of strategic planning to coordinate organizing activities among unions.
Id.; see also Frank Swoboda, Labor Wants Political Focus on Wages; AFL-CIO to Mount
Campaign to Keep Issue at Center of '96 Elections, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1995, at A20.
Starting in June, the AFL-CIO plans to send 1,000 college students and young work-
ers into the field to help start membership organizing campaigns as part of what the
federation has labeled the Union Summer campaign.
Id.
97. The right to permanently replace economic strikers is traced to the Supreme Court's
decision in NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). Most observers
think that management's willingness to use this weapon stems from President Reagan's
decision to replace the striking air traffic controllers in 1981. See Study Reviews Strike
Activity and Use of Permanent Replacements over55 Years, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 92, at
d-8 (May 16, 1994).
An analysis of 165 strikes from 1935 through 1990 suggests that strikes after 1981-
the year President Reagan fired nearly 12,000 members of the Professional Air
Traffic Controllers Organization for participating in an illegal strike-were longer,
and involved more strikers and more permanent replacements than strikes in the
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.
Id.
98. The Workplace Fairness Act died in the Senate in 1994. See Defeat of Striker
Replacement Bill a Victory for Business Coalition, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 133, at d-4
(July 14, 1994).
99. The right to picket for recognition is governed by section 8(b)(7), which allows such
activity-accompanied by striking-as long as it does not continue beyond 30 days without
the filing of a petition. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1994).
100. See Juuus GETmAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONs: LAW AND
REALrrY 134-35 (1988).
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could significantly disrupt an employer's business, especially if
timed to occur during particularly busy times.10 1
As economic strikers, employees engaged in a recognitional
strike could be permanently replaced, a tactic that employers have
been more willing to use since President Reagan's replacement of
striking air traffic controllers in 1981. However, the NLRA
attempts to funnel such disputes into elections rather quickly 02 and
a short term strike might demonstrate the union's power at little
risk to employees. Moreover, the union has options that do not
involve replacement risk. Unions can, of course, picket for recogni-
tion and, if they heed the restrictions of the publicity proviso to
section 8(b)(7), they can do so indefinitely.1 3 Even more impor-
tant, the Supreme Court's decision in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council"° legit-
imized secondary consumer boycotts that the NLRB-and
unions-had previously believed unlawful. After DeBartolo, unions
must no longer demonstrate some significant business relationship
between a primary employer and a secondary target, so long as it
confines its activity to consumer-directed handbilling.105
101. There is some question about whether a strategically timed strike is protected
activity, though the better cases find that it is, at least as long as there is no damage to
employer property. See, eg., ROBERT A. GoRMAN, BAsic TFX ON LABOR LAw.
UNIONIZATON AND CoL crsTv BARGANI NG 312-14 (1976).
102. A complete discussion of limitations included in section 8(b)(7), including the so-
called expedited election, is beyond the scope of this article. For a fuller discussion, see id. at
220-39.
103. Like its counterpart in section 8(b)(4), discussed infra, the publicity proviso to
section 8(b)(7) allows a union to publicize its dispute to consumers. Importantly, however,
section 8(b)(7) allows unions to accomplish this by picketing, even if they have an
organizational objective, so long as their picketing does not have the effect of inducing other
employees to refuse to cross the picket line. For a more complete discussion see id. at 236-39.
104. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
105. A complete discussion of the issues raised by DeBartolo and the publicity proviso to
the NLRA's secondary boycott provisions is beyond the scope of this article. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(7)(C) (1994) (making it an unfair labor practice for unions to embroil neutral
employers in their disputes with so-called primary employers). In the circumstances discussed
in this article, the primary employer would be the employer the union sought to organize.
However, the publicity proviso to section 8(b)(4) exempted activity "other than picketing"
when the purpose was to advise the public "are produced by an employer with whom the
labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer . I... d.
§ 158(b)(4). Historically, the NLRB gave a broad interpretation to the producer-distributor
relationship required under the publicity proviso. The result was to allow unions to publicize
the fact, usually by handbilling, but also by other means of advertising other than picketing,
that an employer carried on some sort of business relationship with an employer against
whom the union had a primary dispute. The principal subject of the Supreme Court's first
1997]
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Under Debartolo, then, a union seeking to organize a recalcitrant
employer could direct its actions not only to the employer, but to
commonly owned enterprises, customers, suppliers, co-tenants and
any other entity that might pressure the employer to temper its
attacks on the union. The union could undertake such handbiling
with simultaneous recognitional picketing of the primary employer
(with or without a strike), which could affect the employer's
employees, as well as its customers.
In the mid 1980's, when President Reagan's NLRB appointees
were changing Board policy at a rapid pace, some union leaders
called for a repeal of the NLRA.10 6 One might question, however,
whether they desired such drastic action. No responsible union offi-
cial could endorse a repeal of legislation that recognizes the right of
employees to join unions and, using their collective strength, press
their employees for fair treatment and an equitable distribution of
the fruits of their labor. No doubt what union officials really wanted
was not the abridgement of section 7 rights but the repeal of the
Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947, which established union unfair
labor practices and curtailed the weapons labor had used most suc-
cessfully against employers, like the secondary boycott and recogni-
tional strikes.
But the call for repeal did more than dramatize labor's frustra-
tion with the conservative tack steered by the Reagan Board. It rec-
ognized that labor could not depend on the administrative
processes of government to protect its ability to organize and bar-
gain for employees. There is no reason for labor to abandon this
DeBartolo decision was how close that relationship had to be for the publicity proviso to
apply. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 463 U.S. 147,152,156 (1983). In the Court's
1988 decision in DeBartolo 11, however, the Court said that the publicity proviso was merely
illustrative and that § 8(b)(4) was not broad enough to encompass any appeals made solely
by handbllling. See DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 588 (1988). The result is that unions are free to use
secondary pressures, including consumer boycotts, whether or not there is a so-called
producer-distributor relationship, so long as its efforts are carried out by handbilling.
106. See, eg., Richard L. Trumka, Why Labor Law Has Failed, 89 W. VA. L. Rav. 871,
881 (1987) (Richard L. Trumka was president of the United Mine Workers union).
I say abolish the Act. Abolish the affirmative protections of labor that it promises
but does not deliver as well as the secondary boycott provisions that hamstring
labor at every turn. Deregulate. Labor lawyers will then go to juries and not to that
gulag of section 7 rights-the Reagan NLRB.
Id.; see also Kirkland Says Many Unions Avoiding NLRB, Calls Board an "Impediment" to
Organizing, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 167, at A-li (Aug. 30,1989) ("[AFL-CIO President
Lane] Kirkland remarked that he would prefer 'no law' to the current labor statutes .... ").
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recognition, merely because of a change in administration and a
somewhat more tolerant NLRB. Liberal or conservative, the reme-
dies imposed by the Board have little effect on obstinate employers
who are willing to brave the administrative and judicial processes to
remain non-union.
Although the NLRA largely restrains union tactics that have
proven effective in the past, Debartolo furnishes an opportunity for
unions to recapture some of the secondary weapons that have
served them well. And the efforts need not end there. Unions that
accept the reality that they cannot depend on NLRB remedies to
protect them will surely develop workable strategies to protect
themselves.
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APPENDIX
UNION QUEsIONMo
In 1981, the NLRB ordered to bargain
with the . Please answer, to the best of your
knowledge, the following questions.
1. Does the above mentioned Union still represent the
employees?
yes- no_
IF THE ANSWER TO QUESTION NUmBER ONE Is No, PLEASE
ANSWER QUESTIONS la, lb and 2; (If the answer to question
number one is YES, please proceed to question number two.)
la. When did the Union stop representing the employees?
(Please enter date)
lb. Why did the Union stop representing the employees?
(Please choose one answer)
(i) The Union was decertified by the employees through
an NLRB election.
(ii) The Union voluntary abandoned (gave up) representa-
tion of the employees.
(iii) Another Union replaced them.
iii.a. Name of the replacing union
iii.b. Date of replacement
iii.c. Does the replacement union still represent the
employees?
yesn_ no
don't know.__
(iv) Other. Please explain why the Union stopped represent-
ing the employees.
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2. Did the Company and the Union ever engage in collective
bargaining?
yes. no___
IF THE ANSWER TO QESTION NUMBER Two Is YES, PLEASE
ANSWER QUESTIONS 2a and 2b; (If the answer to question two is
No, please proceed to question number three.)
2a. Over what period of time did the parties bargain?
From to
2b. Did the Company and the Union ever enter into a collective
bargaining agreement (a labor contract) as a result of
negotiations?
yesno _ no- negotiations in progress
IF THE ANSWER TO QUESTION NUMBER 2b Is YEs, PLEASE
ANSWER T=E FOLLOWING QUESTIONS; (If the answer is No, please
proceed to the end of the form.)
(i) What were the beginning and ending dates of the first
contract?
Beginning , Ending
(ii) Did the first contract include a wage increase?
If yes, approximately how large of a wage increase (stated in
percentage terms)?
(iii) Did the first contract include a wage decrease?
If yes, approximately how large of a wage decrease (stated
in percentage terms)?
(iv) Have there been any more contracts since the first one?
yes-- no__
(v) What were the beginning and ending dates of those
contracts?
Beginning , Ending
19971
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IF THE ANSWER TO QUESTION NUMBER Two Is No (i.e., if there
was never any bargaining between the Company and the Union)
PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTION.
3. The Company and the Union never bargained because:
_____3a. The Union never requested bargaining.
_____3b. The employer went out of business.
Date employer closed business
_____3c. Other (please explain why this Union and the Com-
pany never bargained).
WILL YOU PLEASE SEND US A Copy OF ALL CoNTRACrs NEGOTI-
ATED BETWEEN THE COMPANY AND THE UNION? This information
is requested only for statistical purposes. Neither the contract nor
identifiable information from the contract will be disclosed
publically.
Would you like to receive a copy of the final report?
-yes no
To return, please enclose completed questionnaire and labor con-
tract(s) in the postage prepaid envelope.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION
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